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Note
THE CHILD DRIVER UNDER THE
KENTUCKY FAMILY PURPOSE DOCTRINE
I. INmoDucrON
The family purpose doctrine, under which the head of a family is
liable for his child's negligent operation of the family car, is firmly
entrenched in Kentucky as it is in about half of the American states.'
The Kentucky Court adopted the doctrine at least 2 fifty-four years
ago3 and has upheld it steadfastly. The doctrine is clearly an exception
to the rule that a parent is not liable for the torts of his child merely
because of the parental relationship, but the text writers 4 endorse
it as an ameliorative device which shifts the loss resulting from
negligent operation of an automobile to one financially able to
compensate the injured party.5
Beginning with the premise that the doctrine is solidly established
in Kentucky law, this Note examines the development of the doctrine
as it relates to the child driver. In addition to analyzing the development and current status of the family purpose rule, the Note discusses the impact of the Kentucky statutes" which affect parental
liability for a child's negligence with an automobile. Attention is
focused on parental liability in three potentially troublesome situations:
where it is questionable whether the person driving the car is a
"child" within the meaning of the doctrine; where the child operates
the vehicle on a trip wholly his own; and where parental consent is
160 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 433 (1949).
An earlier case, Lashbrook v. Patten, 62 Ky. (1 Duvall) 317 (1864), has
been widely cited as the basis for the application of the doctrine in Kentucky. In
that case a father was held liable for the negligence of his minor son in driving
the family carriage, the theory of liability being the vicarious liability of a master
for the tort of his servant, since the son was performing a task generally performed by the father's slave. Whether the Court was really bound by the rule of
this case when it faced less picturesque cases involving the destruction resulting
from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle is, at least, doubtful.
3 Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386, 144 S.W. 52 (1912).
4
MEcHEm, AGENCY 324-25 (4th ed. 1952); PRossEa, TORTS 499 (3d ed.
2

1964); SEAvEY, AGENCY 155 (1964).
5 Prosser described the family purpose doctrine as "an ingenious fiction, re-

sorted to as a partial and inadequate step in the direction of an ultimate rule

which will hold the owner of the car liable in all cases for the negligence of
the driver to whom he entrusts it...." PRossFx, Id. at 499.
6 Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter referred to as KESI §§ 186.590 (1942), 2.015
(1964).
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lacking. An attempt to outline the doctrine's future in Kentucky and
to arrive at an evaluation of the doctrine concludes the discussion.
II. THE "ADULT CHmID" RULE
When the Court of Appeals first confronted a case wherein the
family purpose doctrine was invoked in an effort to place liability on
the parent of an adult driver, it affirmed a directed verdict for the
parent.7 The issue of whether the driver's age alone was sufficient to
render the doctrine inapplicable was not presented to the Court
directly, since the directed verdict was affirmed on the ground that
the driver had not been serving a family interest in driving the automobile when the collision occurred.
But two years later, in 1928, the Court decided two cases in which
it clarified its position. In one of these, Bradley v. Schmidt," the
doctrine was relied upon by the plaintiff in an attempt to recover
from the father of a self-supporting twenty-four year old son. As in
the earlier case, the Bradley decision turned on the Court's belief
that since the son was driving the family car for his own and not a
family use, the agency relationship necessary to render the father
liable under the family purpose doctrine was absent. But in Bradley
the Court took the opportunity to state by way of dictum:
While it may be true that a parent may be responsible for the negligence
of his child in operating, with the parent's consent, an automobile
maintained by the parent for family use where the child is living in the
household of the parent as an object of his bounty and is a person whom
the parent is under a moral or legal obligation to support, . . . where
these elements are not present, no ground of liability on the part of the
parent can be discovered.9 (Emphasis added.)

In the second 1928 case, Malcolm v. Nunn,10 the Court faced the
"adult child" question more squarely. It held that a mere allegation
that the parent owned and maintained the car which his son
negligently operated was insufficient to impose liability on the parent
7
Rauch-horst v. Krout, 216 Ky. 328, 287 S.W. 895 (1926). In this case the
driver was the defendant's twenty-three year old son. The son was independently
employed and resided with his parents as a paying boarder, his rent payments
being their chief source of income. He drove the family car to his own place of
employment as well as driving his parents to their places of employment and on
pleasure trips. On the day of the accident the son was returning home from
work. While this case cannot be said to have established an "adult child" exception to the family purpose rule, it was soon cited as authority for the proposition
that the doctrine is inapplicable in the absence of a showing that the driver drove
as an agent of the owner or that the family as a whole benefited from the driving.
See Kennedy v. Wolf, 221 Ky. 111, 298 S.W. 188 (1927).
8 223 Ky. 784, 4 S.W.2d 703 (1928).
9 Id. at 789. 4 S.W.2d at 705.
10 226 Ky. 275, 10 S.W.2d 817 (1928).
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under the family purpose doctrine. A close examination of the opinion

reveals that the Court believed the doctrine applicable only where the
driver was under twenty-one years of age and was operating the

vehicle on a family mission."
In a 1930 case, Creaghead v. Hafele's Adnr,12 the Court of Appeals faced another case involving operation of a family car by a

person not clearly a "child" within the doctrine. Since the decision
turned once again on the absence of an agency relationship, the Court
gave only scant attention to the age of the driver and the parent's
duty of support. 13 However, it did note that the defendant-parent was
under no legal or moral obligation to support his "child," a college
instructor some thirty years of age who was self-supporting and did
not live with her parents. In 1932 the Court formulated a clear holding
that the doctrine was applicable only where the owner-parent was
under a legal or moral obligation to support the driver of the vehicle
14
or where the driver was under twenty-one.
Since the emergence of these two adult child tests, the Court has
referred more frequently to the "obligation" test. In the two most
recent cases in which the driver's status as a child has been put in
issue, the decision was couched in terms of "obligation."' 5 However,
" The Court cited the Bradley case and stated:
As to Dr. Nunn there is neither allegation nor proof that Bruce Nunn
was under 21 years of age, and neither is there any proof that he was
driving the machine on any mission or business of his father's at the
time of the accident. Under that state of facts he would not have been
responsible, even if Bruce Nunn had been negligent. Id. at 277, 10
S.W.2d at 819.
Whether the Court intended to establish a new test, one based only on the
driver's age, in addition to the legal or moral obligation test to which it had
alluded in the Bradley case is doubtful. It would seem more probable that a
loose reading of Bradley led the Court to assume that a "twenty-one" test had
already been established. The existence or non-existence of a "twenty-one" test
might be significant in light of recent legislation to be discussed infra.
12 286 Ky. 250, 32 S.W.2d 997 (1930).
13 The daughter in Craegheadhad driven the family car on a purely personal
trip. Under the rule of Kennedy v. Wolf, 221 Ky. 111, 298 S.W. 188 (1927),
this fact was sufficient in itself to take the parent out of the doctrine.
14 Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932).
'5 In McNamara v. Prather, 277 Ky. 754, 755, 127 S.W.2d 160, 161 (1939)
it was stated by way of dictum that "a parent who owns, maintains, or provides
an automobile for the pleasure or convenience of the family is not liable for its
negligent use by an adult child whom the parent is under no legal or moral
obligation to support."
In Walker v. Farley, 308 Ky. 163, 164, 213 S.W.2d 1016, 1017 (1948), where
there was no evidence that the son whose negligence was sought to be imputed
to the defendant father was a member of the father's household or was under
twenty-one, the Court held, "the doctrine does not apply in the case of an
adult child using his parents car for his own purpose and pleasure unless he is
living in the household of the parent as an object of his bounty and the parent
is under a moral or legal obligation to support him."
It is interesting to note that no Kentucky decision has attempted to define
(Continued on next page)
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the "twenty-one" test continues to have efficacy despite its relative

dormancy. Since its use in the 1928 and 1932 cases discussed above,
the "twenty-one" test has been invoked at least twice. 16 Admittedly,
the Court has never been presented with a case where the applicability
of the doctrine turned solely on the age of the driver. But until the
cases which established the test have been overruled, the "twenty-one"
test must be cautiously recognized. At its very least, the age of the

driver will be one determinative factor in implementing the "obligation" test. It is worthy of recognition for this reason if for no other.
Another aspect of the "adult child" exception which has been
troublesome is the confusion of the doctrine with pure agency principles. This is probably a result of the Court's tendency to employ
agency language when dealing with family purpose cases. An examination of two recent developments in the Kentucky family purpose law
should clarify any misunderstanding. First, it should be clearly understood that a parent who escapes liability under the family purpose
doctrine will be held liable under the traditional rules of agency if the
child was in fact an agent of the parent. 1 7 Therefore, the doctrine and
the agency rule of respondeat superior afford the plaintiff two different
theories under which to seek recovery from the parent. Second, while
the family purpose rule was originally believed to be an agency
doctrine,' 8 it is safe to say that the Kentucky Court now recognizes
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

"moral or legal obligation" as the term is used in the doctrine. The conclusion
seems to be that the definition would be that applied in the field of domestic law,
but the question remains open.
It is further noted that part of the quoted portion of the Farley opinion
which would require as a condition of application of the doctrine that the child
be a resident of the defendant parents' household has never been tested. It is
submitted that if a case ever arises where liability is sought to be avoided on
this basis alone, the Court will hold the parent liable on the ground that the
purpose of the doctrine requires it.
16 In Miracle v. Cavins, 254 Ky. 644, 72 S.W.2d 25 (1934) the defendant
parent, against whom the family purpose rule had been invoked, was held entitled
to a directed verdict. The record showed that the son driving the family car was
twenty-three years old and independently employed. Abell v. Whitehead, 266
Ky. 764, 99 S.W.2d 770 (1936) held that where the defendant's twenty-three
year old son drove the car for his own pleasure and there was no evidence of an
agency relationship between the defendant and the son, the defendant was outside
the doctrine. In the Abell case the Court said that the relationship between the
defendant and his son and the latter's personal use of the family car on the
occassion brought the case into the exception to the family purpose rule set up
in Ludwig, Hall, Craeghead, and Bradley. The facts of the Abell case do not
justify its loose language concerning the "obligation" test, since they show only
that the defendant's son was twenty-three and was not serving as his father's
agent. It is submitted that the use of "obligation" language in cases such as this
has led to the mistaken belief that that test is exclusive.
17 Wireman v. Salyer, 336 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1960).
IsSale v. Atkins, 206 Ky. 224, 267 S.W. 228 (1924).
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the doctrine as one motivated by policy considerations which justify its
extension beyond the limits of liability under agency law.19 In the
future the Court will probably employ language which recognizes
this change, and the drift from agency law will become more apparent.
By way of summary, it appears that the "adult child" exception to
the family purpose rule, at least as far as the case law is concerned, is
fairly static. The Court of Appeals has required that there be a showing that the driver was a person whom the defendant-parent was
morally or legally obligated to support. There is at least a strong
possibility that it also requires that the driver be under twenty-one.
Since a person to whom a parent owes no support obligation can be
expected to be financially responsible, the Kentucky Court has
formulated an "adult child" rule consistent with the doctrine as a
whole.
III. THE CMx'S USE OF THE VEHMCLE
His OWN PUPOSES

FOR

Assuming that a given automobile is a family vehicle within the
meaning of the family purpose doctrine, should the doctrine impose
liability upon a parent for the negligence of a child in operating the
vehicle on a trip wholly his own? About half 2° the courts which follow
the family purpose rule have answered this question in the negative.
Those courts have reasoned that the doctrine is applicable only where
a "family" car is being driven for a "family" purpose and that a child
21
who drives for his own pleasure is not furthering such a purpose.
This line of reasoning rings with common sense, and its attractiveness
to those courts which still conceptualize the doctrine as based on
agency principles is understandable.
Kentucky, along with the other half of the family purpose jurisdictions, has rejected this view. 22 Our Court reasons that, where the head
Turner v. Hall's Adm'x, 252 S.W.2d 30 (1952).
Annot., 132 A.L.R. 981 (1941); Annot., 100 A.L.R. 1021 (1936); Annot.,
88 A.L.R. 601 (1934); Annot., 64 A.L.R. 844 (1930). Examination of supplementary material discloses that the numerical alignment of the courts has
remained substantially the same.
21 See, e.g., Clawson v. Schroeder, 208 Pac. 924, 926 (Mont. 1922):
It is a rule well established that the father cannot be held responsible
for the tort of his son, committed without his knowledge or authority,
express or implied. The only ground upon which the father can be held
answerable for the act of his son in the case under consideration excludes the idea of an independent venture on the part of the son.
22 Stowe v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386, 144 S.W. 52 (1912). In this case the
family purpose rule was held to impose liability upon a father for his teenage
19
20

(Continued on next page)
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of the family purchases and maintains an automobile for the pleasure
of his family, he makes their pleasure his "business." When the child
drives the car for his own pleasure, he is furthering that "business"
and is, therefore, an agent of the owner. Professor Mechem concurs in
this approach,2s although he characterizes the issue as "a little difficult
24
to answer."
But it would be wrong to entertain the notion that the family
purpose rule applies to any case of a minor driving an automobile
which belongs to his parents. In the first place, the vehicle must be
a family purpose vehicle. Thus the doctrine will not apply in the
case of a son who drives his father's vehicle on a mission ordered by
and beneficial to the father, where the vehicle was not purchased and
maintained for the benefit and pleasure of the family. 5 In such a
case the father's liability wvil be determined by agency law.26 The difference between liability under agency law and under the doctrine is
significant where the driver exceeds limitations imposed by the
parent.27 In the second place, it must be kept in mind that the
doctrine will impose liability upon the head of the family, even where
the vehicle is in fact a "family" vehicle, only when the head of the
family owns the vehicle. 28 Thus, the Kentucky Court refused to hold
a father liable for his daughter's negligent operation of a "family" car
which, in fact, belonged to the daughter.2 9
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

son's negligent operation of the family car while taking his friends on a joyride. The Court made crystal clear that
the only ground upon which the father can be held answerable for this
act of his son [is] ... that the machine was bought and operated for the

pleasure of the family; that, at the time of the accident, the son was engaged in carrying out the general purpose for which the machine was
bought and kept; and that, as he took it out at the time, in pursuance of
general authority from his father to take it when he pleased, for the
pleausre of the family and himself as a member of it, the purpose for
which it had been bought, he was engaged in the execution of his father's
business, i.e., the supplying of recreation to the members of the father's
family. Id. at 388, 144 S.W. at 53.
The continuing efficacy of Stowe is shown by its favorable citation in Wireman v.
Salyer,
2 3 336 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1960).
MECHEM, op. cit.
supra note 4.
24 Ibid.
25 Sanders v. Lakes, 270 Ky. 98, 109 S.W.2d 36 (1937).
26 Ibid.
27 Suffice it for the present to say that the principal's liability under the agency
rules of frolic and detour is less extensive than it would be under the doctrine's
broadening
rules of consent which are discussed infra.
28
Carricato -. Carricato, 384 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964). The case involved an
interesting question of emancipation which might be revived by recent legislation
to be considered infra.
29 Ibid. An examination of the significance of "ownership" of the vehicle will
be undertaken in the discussion of the future of the doctrine infra.
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These considerations aside, however, it can safely be said that a
child who drives the family car for his own pleasure is furthering a
family purpose. The doctrine clearly applies in such an instance.
IV. C-mw

DliviNG SuRBEPTrOUSLY OR

iN ExcEss oF Pmau.m

SIoN

The most stringent test of the theoretical basis of the family
purpose doctrine arises in cases where the child injures the plaintiff
while driving without the defendant parent's permission or, having
obtained permission, in excess of restrictions imposed by the parent.
Under the doctrine as it stood at that time, a 1932 writer correctly
wrote, "As the doctrine is based on the relation of principal and agent,
it has no application where a child surreptitiously obtains the family
car and drives it without the consent of the owner."30 No other conclusion could have been reached in light of the decision in Sale v.
Atkins,31 the first case in which the Kentucky Court was confronted
with a child who obtained the use of the family car surreptitiously.
The defendant parent in Sale pleaded as an affirmative defense
that the child had taken the car surreptitiously, without defendant's
knowledge, and contrary to instructions, and that the child had never
been permitted to drive alone. The evidence supported his allegations.
In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, the Court was obviously unwilling on the facts before it to hold that the child was an agent of
the parent. Consequently, it was compelled to hold the doctrine
inapplicable. 32 However, the Court hinted at future development when
it said, in effect, that a cause of action would be stated if the plaintiff showed that it was the custom or privilege of the child to use the
car, even if there were no showing of express permission to use it.
Technically, the narrow rule of Sale may still be the law in Kentucky. Actually, since its inception the rule of Sale has been eroded
by the "custom or privilege" approach mentioned above33 and by
implied permission to use. The Court has indulged in a certain amount
30 Note, 21 Ky. L.J. 485 (1932).
31206 Ky. 224, 267 S.W. 223 (1924).
32 Id. at 226, 267 S.W. at 224:

The whole [family purpose] doctrine is rested upon the theory that
the child is the agent of the parent operating the car with his knowledge,
acquiesence and consent, but has no application to cases where the child
surreptitiously obtains possession of the car and without the knowledge
or consent of the parent operates it upon a highway. Unless the relation
of principal and agent exists between the parent and child, in the
operation of the car, the parent is not liable for damages resulting from
the negligent operation of the car by the infant.
33 See Note, 38 Ky. L.J. 156 (1949).

1967]

NOTE

of judicial legislation aimed at avoiding, but not overtly destroying,
the rule of Sale. The result has been imposition of an almost absolute
liability upon the parent for the negligence of the child in driving
the family car. A study of the cases since Sale substantiates this contention.
The Court in two decisions following Sale made two points clear.
First, it held that a parent who sought to bring himself under the protection of Sale must have made a realistic attempt to enforce his prohibition of the child's use of the family car. 34 Second, it held that,
where a parent gave his child permission to use the vehicle for a
limited time and for a specific task, the permission would not render
the parent liable for the child's use of the car on a subsequent trip
undertaken without the parent's consent or knowledge. 35 On the basis
of these elaborations of Sale, a parent could protect himself from
liability under the doctrine by prohibiting his child from driving the
family car (providing he made a realistic effort to enforce the prohibition) or by permitting the child to operate the car for limited
purposes or periods of time only.
Since 1950 the Court of Appeals has rendered three opinions which
have effectively vitiated the rule of Sale. In Turner v. Halls Adm'x 36
the child had driven the family car to school and to extracurricular
events for over a year. The defendant father had given the child express permission to use the car, with the only limitation being that the
child should permit no other person to drive. The child violated this
instruction by permitting a friend to drive; it was the negligence of the
friend that caused the plaintiff's injury. Plaintiff sought recovery from
the father on the theory that the driver was an agent of the son and
the son, by operation of the family purpose doctrine, an agent of the
father. The father requested an instruction that any agency relationship between him and his son was terminated when the son disobeyed
his instructions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial
of this instruction. In so doing, the Court recognized that the case involved a new aspect of the exceeded permission problem, namely,
whether a parent, after giving a child permission to use the car for
34
Wells v. Lockhart, 258 Ky. 698, 81 S.W.2d 5 (1935). In this case the
evidence showed that the defendant's son had habitually driven the car and that
the car was ke t in an unlocked garage. It was held that the defendant's testimony to the effect that he had "lectured" his son on driving alone did not entitle
him to a directed verdict. The plaintiff's proof was that the child had been seen
driving the car on a number of occasions. The Court remarked that this latter
proof "was of such a nature and the occasions so numerous as to authorize the
inference that appellant... acquiesed in such use .. " Id. at 701-02, 81 S.W.2d
at 7.
35 Cook v. Hall. 308 Ky. 500, 214 S.W.2d 1017 (1948).
36 252 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1952).
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the purpose for which it was purchased, "could limit the extent of his
liability by specific instructions... concerning... its operation... :"3
The Court answered its own question in the negative as follows:
The Family Purpose Doctrine is a humanitarian one designed for the
protection of the public generally, and resulted from recognition of the
fact that in the vast majority of instances an infant has not sufficient
property in his own right to indemnify one who may suffer from his
negligent act.
We believe the purpose of this doctrine would be destroyed entirely if
a father could relieve himself of responsibility by specific instructions
known only to himself and his son. Even in cases of the strict commercial relationship
of master and servant, the courts have not permitted
38
such a limitation.

The first paragraph of this quotation has been widely accepted as
authority for the proposition that the Kentucky Court in Turner discarded agency principles as the conceptual foundation of the doctrine.39 However, the Kentucky doctrine, as affected by Turner, apparently retained its agency basis for a while longer. Examination of
the second quoted paragraph shows that the Court was swayed by
its belief that once the child had been placed in possession of the
vehicle, and therefore was furthering the purpose of his father by
using it for his own pleasure, 40 the principal-agent relationship thus
established could not be terminated by instructions limiting the child's
use. It is the writer's conclusion that Turner, rather than abandoning
agency principles, utilized them to nullify the defendant's attempts at
restrictions on his liability. At the very least Turner could have been
decided on agency law without resort to considerations peculiar to
the family purpose doctrine.
In 1953 the Court considered Richardsonv. True,41 where the child,
at the time of the accident, was violating instructions from the
defendant-mother that he was not to drive outside the city. The
evidence showed that the mother knew that the child on many
occasions, despite her objections, had driven outside the city and was
in the habit of taking the car keys from their hiding place and driving
without permission. Reversing a directed verdict for the mother, the
Court of Appeals held that there was a jury question of whether the
son, on the day he injured the plaintiff, had driven with the mothers
37
38

Id.at 32.
Ibid. (citing

IlEsTATEmmNr, AGENCY § 588).

39 Prosser quotes this paragraph as authority for his statement that the family
purpose doctrine has often been recognized as an instrument of policy. Peossim,
op. cit.
supra note 4, at 497.
40
Stowe v. Monms, 147 Ky. 386, 144 S.W. 52 (1912).
41 259 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1953).
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tacit or implied consent. The Court relied on Turner v. Hairs Adm'x 4 2
as its authority.
A distinction between Richardson and Turner should be noted. The
Court in Turner held that, once the parent had made the child his
agent, he could not restrict that agency by placing limitations on the
permission that he had granted the child. In Richardson, on the other
hand, it does not appear that the parent ever gave such broad permission to use the family car. Indeed, the permission, if any existed at
all, was so narrow that the son violated it by the very taking of the car.
The agency rule, which the Court perhaps unknowingly applied in
Turner, is inapplicable to the facts of Richardson. Apparently there is
no rule of agency law which would allow a person, by his own unauthorized acts, to force another into a principal-agent relationship
with him. On this basis it is submitted that in Richardson our Court
abandoned agency law as the foundation of the family purpose
doctrine. Since the Court decided the case on the strength of Turner,
the transition was made without the benefit of a reasoned opinion to
support it. To the extent that the Court never really met the problem
head-on, the abandonment in Richardson was unfortunate and untimely.
The most recent case extends the rule of Richardson only slightly.
In First-City Bank and Trust Co. v. Doggett4 3 the evidence showed
that the son had standing permission to use the car and, although he
usually obtained express permission, he had occasionally taken it without obtaining such permission. On the day in question the parent
had expressly instructed the boy not to use the car because the
parent might need it to go to the doctor. The son violated this
direction, and while driving the car he injured the plaintiff. Affirming
a directed verdict against the parent, the Court of Appeals held that
where the family car is customarily available for use by a child, and
a particular use of the car is denied because of family matters, the
mere denial of permission does not render the parent immune from
the family purpose doctrine.
The Court anticipated the argument that this decision would render
it impossible for a parent to protect himself from liability under the
doctrine. It countered the argument with the following dictum:
[W]e are of the opinion that a complete revocation of previous general
permission should not be given recognition unless a sufficient period of
time has lapsed following the revocation, during which the revocation
42252 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1952).

43 316 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1958).
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has been enforced, to justify the conclusion that it was a bona fide
a mere temporary suspension of permission as a
revocation rather than
44
disciplinary action.

A reading of the cases from Sale through Dogget shows that the
Court has made a complete about-face in its attitude toward the
parent's liability for the negligence of the child who drives without,
or in excess of, parental consent. This reversal was made possible only
by sacrificing the agency basis of the doctrine. The writer is not
satisfied with the way in which this was done. However the result,
i.e., supplying the motoring public with a cause of action against the
parent under the doctrine, is consistent with the purposes of the
doctrine since it supplies a remedy for injuries caused by a child
driving without parental consent or beyond parental limitations. The
parent who wants to protect himself from the doctrine should take
measures which effectively prevent his child from driving the family
car, and he should continue these measures long enough to make them
appear meaningful and realistic.
V. THE FuruTE OF THE Docram

The ever-increasing motorization of our society will inevitably cause
corresponding increases in injuries caused by the negligent operation of
family vehicles by children. The very nature of the family purpose
doctrine will lead the Court to broaden its scope and thereby extend
relief to a greater number of injured litigants. Considerations of
general policy which will prompt the Court are too nebulous and
speculative for useful discussion in this Note, but there are other,
more concrete, factors which will shape the doctrine's development.
Legislation-past, present, and future-has affected and will continue to affect the rule. Assuming the General Assembly does not
render the doctrine moot by enactment of a compulsory automobile
insurance statute, 45 our bench and bar must adapt themselves to the
4
doctrine as it exists within the framework of two related statutes.
The first of these, KRS 186.590, has been on the books for thirty
years, so there is some indication of what its impact on the doctrine
will be. The statute provides, in effect, that the negligence of a driver
under eighteen years of age will be imputed to the person who signed
his application for an operator's license, to every motor vehicle owner
who permits a child under eighteen to drive his car, or to any person
44 Id. at 230.
45 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 90, §

1A (1964); N.Y.

TRAFFIC LAW § 312 (1960).
46yKRs § 2.015 (1964); KRS § 186.590 (1942).
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who gives or furnishes a motor vehicle to such a child.47 Although the
family purpose doctrine and this statute do not "clash" and although
most litigation under the statute has been on the issue of whether the
statute imputes the minor's contributory negligence to the adult,48 the

statute does affect the doctrine to a limited extent. That is, a plaintiff
injured by a child driver's negligent operation of a family car has two
possible theories of recovery if the child is under eighteen. First, of
course, is the doctrine. Second, the plaintiff can sue under the statute,
provided the defendant fits one of the three classes of persons whom
the statute renders jointly and severally liable. The statute's practical
effect is to render the doctrine unnecessary in cases where the statute
applies.

One important difference in recovery under the doctrine and under
the statute should be emphasized. As discussed above, the Court has
adopted a liberal "implied permission to use" theory in family purpose
cases involving a child driving without parental permission or contrary
to parental restrictions.49 Under the statute, however, the Court has
not formulated such a liberal rule. By the terms of the statute, the
"permission" problem does not arise if liability is charged because the
adult defendant signed the child's application for a license.9 0 If the
plaintiff seeks to bring his suit under the other provisions of the
statute, however, he must prove that the adult defendant had actual
knowledge9 ' that the child was driving the car made available to him,
or at least present strong evidence that the youth drove with the conn2
sent of the adult

53
So a plaintiff injured by the negligent driving of a family vehicle
47 KRS § 186.590 provides:

(1) Any negligence of a minor under the age of eighteen who has been
licensed upon an application signed as provided by KRS 186.470, when
driving any motor vehicle upon a highway, shall be imputed to the
person who signed the application of the minor for the license ... (3)
Every motor vehicle owner who causes or knowingly permits a minor
under the age of eighteen to drive the vehicle upon a highway, and
any person who gives or furnishes a motor vehicle to the minor shall
be jointly and severally liable for damages caused by the negligence of
4the
8 minor in driving the vehicle.
Kentucky has taken the minority position that contributory negligence is not
so imputed by the statute. Sizemore v. Bailey's Adm'r, 293 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1956);
8 Amd.4 9 Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 676 (1963).
First-City Bank and Trust Co. v. Doggett, 316 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1958).
G0 But the adult who has signed the application can avoid liability under
KRS 186.590(1) if the youth files or has filed in his behalf a proof of financial
responsibility. See KRS § 186.590(2) (1942).
91 Cook v. Hall, 308 Ky. 500, 214 S.W.2d 1017 (1948).
12 Meadows v. Bailey, 350 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1961).
53 In this respect it should be remembered that the statute goes far beyond
the doctrine since it applies to anti person putting a youth behind the wheel of
any automobile. However, this will not serve to place liability upon the vendor
of an automobile. Falendar v. Hankins, 296 Ky. 396, 177 S.W.2d 882 (1944).

KENTucKY-LAw JouFNAV

[Vol. 55,

by a child below the age of eighteen will have a statutory remedy
against the owner parent if the latter signed the child's application
for a driver's license, consented to the child's driving of the vehicle, or
had actual knowledge that the child was driving. Since the owner
parent is likely to fall into one of these three categories, as far as
children under eighteen are concerned, the family purpose doctrine
is not of great utility to plaintiffs.
The second statute which must be considered in studying the
doctrine is the 1964 enactment 54 lowering the age of majority to
eighteen:
Persons of the age of eighteen years are of the age of majority for all
purposes in this Comnonwealth except for the purchase of alcoholic
beverages and treatment of handicapped children, for which twentyone years is still the age of majority.

This statute will not control the case of majority in a situation for
which a previously-enacted statute prescribes a different age.5 5 But
where a contrary statutory age of majority is not specified, the statute
will govern." The Court of Appeals has recognized that the statute
might well play havoc with the family purpose rule.5 7 An attempt will
be made to explore in some detail what the statute's impact will be.
In the first place, this statute, by operating in conjunction with
KRS 186.590, might well be the death knell of the doctrine, at least
as far as the child driver is concerned. It was shown earlier in this
Note that the test of whether a person is a child for purposes of the
doctrine is whether the parent is under a moral or legal duty to support him.5 8 Kentucky law does not require a parent to support an
adult child, 9 except in very limited circumstances, 60 so it may well
follow that the parent is no longer under any legal obligation to support his issue after they reach eighteen. A parent's moral obligation to
support an adult child is at best a nebulous concept, but it could at
least give the Court a peg upon which to hang a decision applying the
54 KS § 2.015 (1964).
55

Commonwealth v. Hallahan, 391 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1965).
56 See 65 Oss. ATr'Y GEN. 41, 67, 176, 650; 66 Ops. ATr'y GEr. 52.
57
Commonwealth v. Hallahan, 391 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Ky. 1965).
58 In the earlier discussion of the "moral or legal obligation" and "twentyone" tests for determining whether a person is a child within the scope of the
family purpose doctrine, it was assumed that "twenty-one" was synonomus with
"age of majority." In light of KRS 2.015, if the Court believed an age test
should be applied in conjunction with an obligation test, or exclusively, it would
be compelled to substitute "eighteen" for "twenty-one.
59 Breuer v. Dowden, 207 Ky. 12, 268 S.W. 541 (1925).
60 Ibid,

NoTE
doctrine to the parent of a negligent eighteen year-old. Since the
doctrine exists for the recognized 6' purpose of supplying a more
effective source of indemnification to the motoring public, it is highly
improbable that the Court would hold the doctrine inapplicable to the
parent of a person over eighteen on the sole ground that the statute in
question bad lowered the age of majority to eighteen. It is submitted
that the Court will continue to apply the doctrine to eighteen to
twenty-one year-olds and adjust to the statute by evolving a different
"adult child" rule.
But the age of majority statute's impact will go further than this.
While the Court may well refuse to hold that the doctrine's upper limits
reach only to the age of eighteen merely because the age of majority
has been lowered to eighteen, the statute might lead to the same
shrinking of the doctrine in a more roundabout way. It can be safely
said that the theoretical basis for vicarious liability under the doctrine
is the belief that the parent can control his child's use of the family
automobile. 62 Even when the doctrine is conceptualized as no more
than a policy-oriented rule, the belief in the parent's right and ability
to exercise such control is apparent. 63 If the eighteen year old is, by
virtue of the new statute, no longer subject to the control of his parents,
or at least the threat of it, an important theoretical leg of the doctrine
will be lacking. An interesting analogy is the youth who is freed from
potential parental control by reason of his marriage.6 4 No case has
been found where the child's marital status alone caused him to be
held to be an adult, but it may be significant that in those Kentucky
cases where the driver's status as a child was at issue, there has never
been a holding that a married driver was a child."5
In still another way the age of majority statute will at least
indirectly affect the family purpose doctrine. This will be a result of
the eighteen year old's newly-created ability to contract for the
61 See PRossEn, ToR-s 497 (3d ed. 1964).
G2 MECHEM, AcENcy 325 (4th ed. 1952).
63 In the Kentucky case which pushes parental liability for the child's

negligent driving in violation of instructions to the furtherest extent to date, the
Court makes it clear that if the parent does, in fact, realistically and effectively with
draw his permission for the child to drive the family car, the parent will be
immune. Implicitly the Court recognizes the right to control. It is the exercise,
not the existence of this control, that determines liability where a child disobeys parental prohibitions or limitations on his driving. First-City Bank and

Trust Co. v. Doggett. 316 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1958).
60 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 89 (1950).
65 Walker v. Farley, 308 Ky. 163, 213 S.W.2d 1016 (1948); Rauckhorst v.
Krout, 216 Ky. 323, 287 S.W. 895 (1926). It may be that marriaFe, by
emancipating the child, would be sufficient in itself to make the child an adult"
regardless of his relationship with his parents.
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purchase of an automobile. Although it is still too early to document
an increase in purchases of cars by youths between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-one, there is no reason to believe an appreciable
increase will not be forthcoming.
The Court of Appeals has long since held that the niceties of legal
title will not detract it from inquiring whether the head of the family
actually provides and maintains the car for the pleasure of his family.'81
This is the position taken by the few courts which have faced the
issue. 67 Perhaps in the last analysis the test will be whether the head
of the family pays for the automobile. If so, the Court should remember that a youth who pays for a car with his own earnings can
be said not to have paid for it if his parents are supporting him and
thereby freeing his wages to be spent for other purposes. 6s But
one overriding consideration must be kept in mind-the family purpose
doctrine does not apply in a case where the negligently-operated
car was not a "family" car within the meaning of the doctrine. 69 If the
parent did not buy the car or free the youth from living expenses and
thereby enable him to buy it, and if the parent has no control over
the child,70 there is no basis for parental liability under the doctrine.
It is strongly urged that the courts should look closely into each
situation to see if the child does in fact "own" the car which he
"purchased." If he does not own it in the sense indicated above, the
situation is no different from that of a family car which has been
66 Gray v. Golden, 301 Ky. 477, 192 S.W.2d 371 (1945).
67Pouliot v. Box, 56 N.M. 566, 256 P.2d 1050 (1952); Stevens v. Van
Deusen, 56 N.M. 128, 241 P.2d 331 (1951); Meinhardt v. Vaughn, 159 Tenn.
272, 17 S.W.2d 5 (1929); Robinson v. Ebert, 180 Wash. 387, 39 P.2d 992 (1935).
See 6 BLASHFrELD, AuTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE 468 (3d ed. 1966).
68In Stevens v. Van Deusen, 56 N.M. 128, 241 P.2d 331 (1951) the
defendant's son purchased the car with his own earnings, but at the time of the
collision he was attending college, living at defendant's home, and supported by
defendant. The earnings were from a job he held while he had "run away" from
home. Although the case was determined on the basis of a statute which, like
KRS 405.010, provided that the parent is entitled to his minor child's earnings,
the court held the defendant liable under the family purpose rule. The court was
impressed by the fact that the defendant helped pay upkeep expenses and that
the son was a minor supported by the defendant.
69Usn "family"' in the broad sense enunciated in Stowve v. Morris, 147
Ky. 386, 144 S.W. 52 (1912), whereby the car is a family vehicle even if the
child drives it to the exclusion of others, since he thereby achieves the purpose
(the child's use and enjoyment of the car) of the father in furnishing the car.
But consider this case: A purchases a car for the use of his family. He purchases another car for the sole use of his teenage son. B. By freeing the family car
from use by B, can A be said to have furthered a family purpose in such a way as
to make him liable for B's use of his "own" car?
70 In this regard KRS 186.590 and 2.015 are complimentary, since the
parent, by KRS 2.015, is undoubtedly entitled to cortrol his child during the
period in which he might be held liable under KRS 186.590. Whether the family
purpose doctrine will be "shrunk" to the point that it is equally complementary
to KRS 2.015 is perhaps the basic issue in the future of the doctrine.

NOTE
given to a child and title placed in his name. 71 The head of the family

should be liable in either situation.
The last aspect of the future of the doctrine to be considered is
whether the Court of Appeals will continue to restrict it to automobiles. Only a handful of courts have determined whether the
doctrine should be extended to cover vehicles other than automobiles
and trucks. Of these, Tennessee has held the doctrine applicable to
motorcycles, 72 while Minnesota73 and North Carolina 74 have held it
inapplicable to motorboats and Washington has refused to apply it
to bicycles. 75 The Tennessee court reasoned that the family purpose
doctrine was applicable to any vehicle when that vehicle's operation
posed a "threat"76 to the motoring public comparable to that created by
the operation of an automobile. 77 The other courts were of the opinion
that the family purpose doctrine exists only because the operation of

automobiles creates a hazard of serious proportions and that it should
not be extended to cover vehicles which do not pose such hazards.
These courts weigh the hazard posed by a vehicle without comparing
78
it to automobile hazards.
71 The Tennessee court ruled that a family car given to a child with title in
his name is still a family purpose car. Meinhardt v. Vaughn, 159 Tenn. 272, 17
S.V.2d 5 (1929). Said the court:
The furnishing, maintainence, and control are ...the essential predicates
of liability of the responsible parent. If this responsibility may be evaded
by merely giving over to an irresponsible minor child the title to such
an instrumentality . . .evil consequence[s] will be invited. 17 S.W.2d
at
7.
72
Meinhardt v. Vaughn, 159 Tenn. 272, 17 S.W.2d 5 (1929).
73
Feleyn v. Gamble, 185 Minn. 357, 241 N.W. 37 (1932).
74 Grindstaff v. Watts, 254 N.C. 568, 119 S.E.2d 784 (1961). But the North
Carolina court indicated that it believes legislation to extend the doctrine to
motorboats
is desirable.
75
Pflugmacher v. Thomas, 34 Wash. 2d 687, 209 P.2d 443 (1949).
70 It should be noted that "threat," as the Tennessee court uses the term,
does not mean the dangers are so great that the automobile is a "dangerous instrumentality" within the meaning of the tort doctrine imposing strict liability upon
a person who turns a dangerous instrumentality loose upon the public. Nichols v.
Smith, 21 Tenn. App. 478, 111 S.W.2d 911 (1937). Although most courts reject
the notion that a car is a "dangerous instrumentality," they recognize that it is,
in fact, capable of being a dangerous instrument. 2 BLAsHFIEL., AroMOBM.E
LAw AND PRActicE § 101.3 (1965).
77 159 Tenn. at 272, 17 S.W.2d at 6.
78 The Minnesota court justified its decision with language which thirty years
of nautical advancement have rendered humorously rustic:
The number of motorboats, even in the state of Minnesota with its
more than 10,000 lakes, is extremely limited when compared with the
number of automobiles upon its highways. Boats, in far greater numbers,
are propelled by oars. Considering the wide expanse of the water surface
of our lakes and rivers and the comparatively small number of motorboats thereon, which do not move in lanes or prescribed routes, a
situation is not presented justifying, much less requiring... the extension
of the family purpose doctrine to cover them. 185 Minn. at 358, 241
N.W. at 38.
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With the current mass purchase and use of such instrumentalities
as motorscooters, air planes, powermowers, motorboats, 79 and other
power-driven vehicles, our Court must prepare to determine whether
the doctrine is applicable to any or all of these vehicles. By using the
Tennessee court's reasoning the Court will have a good standard: does
the vehicle pose a hazard comparable to that created by an automobile? Whether the Court compares the particular hazard with the
"automobile" hazard of today or of the era when Kentucky adopted
the doctrine may affect the outcome. But if the Court should be inclined, as other courts have done,80 to simply weigh the hazards
created by the vehicle without reference to the hazards from automobiles, it will still have a workable standard. In either case the
ultimate issue will be whether protection of the public demands
extension of the doctrine. Should the increase in the number of such
machines continue, it seems inevitable that the Court will be compelled
by considerations of policy to broaden the doctrine to a greater extent.
VI. EVALUATION OF ilE DocrTu TE

Having traced the development of the family purpose doctrine
from its origins in the respondeat superior principle of agency to its
present status as a humanitarian ameliorative doctrine, the remainder
of this Note discusses whether the doctrine is effectively achieving its
purpose and suggests alternatives.
The loopholes through which a parent can escape liability under
the doctrine are numerous. To summarize those already examined,
a parent will not be liable for his child's negligence if the automobile
was not a family car, if the child was an adult within the meaning of
the doctrine, or if the child drove in violation of meaningful and
realistic prohibitions. The new age of majority statute will in all
likelihood broaden these exceptions. In light of these exceptions,
then, a certain number of motorists injured by youthful drivers will
79 In 1960 (when records were initiated) there were approximately 2-5,000
motorboats registered for use on Kentucky waterways. In May of 1963, 34,000
craft were registered. 53,000 craft were registered as of July 15, 1966, and
officials expected a total registration of 60,000 before the end of August, 1966.
This information was secured by a telephone interview with Mr. William K. King,
Director of the Kentucky Division of Boating, on July 29, 1966. The reader is
asked t- take notice of comparable increases in other types of vehicles.
80 See, e.g., the reasoning of the court in Pflugmacher v. Thomas, 34 Wash.
2d 687, 209 P.2d 443, 445 (1949):
We are not convinced from what has been presented to us by the record ... or from what we can judically notice, that the use of a bicycle
...
although capable of doing harm to others if negligently operated,
requires or would justify . . . extending . . the .. . doctrine to ...
[such] a case.

have no claim for relief against the parent under the doctrine. Moreover, the doctrine may already have been legislated into uselessness.
As previously discussed, a plaintiff might well have a statutory remedy
against the parent of a child below eighteen without resort to the doctrine. By reason of the majority statute it is quite possible that a
person eighteen or older will not be a child for purposes of the
doctrine. Since this statute, presumably, will give him the financial
standing of an adult, a remedy against the parent for such a youth's
negligence may no longer exist.
From the plaintiff's standpoint, these shortcomings make the doctrine less than ideal as a remedial theory. In a given case the doctrine
will be of no use whatsoever, but its retention could not be detrimental
to the plaintiffs cause. At its worst, then, the docrine's shortcomings
do not warrant discarding it.
By the same line of reasoning, it appears that some effective remedy
must be provided for a plaintiff who finds himself unable to invoke
the family purpose rule. Assuming that no unforeseen judically-created
remedy is formulated, the General Assembly must act to achieve this
purpose. A close examination of potential legislation to provide the
motoring public with effective remedies is beyond the scope of this
Note."' However, a few possibilities are worth mentioning.
First, the Legislature might require an effective showing of
financial responsibility by the parent, or by the child, or by both, before
a license will be issued to the child.8 2 Our present financial responsibility laws 3 is a step in the right direction, but it needs strengthening.8 "
81 Writings dealing with the public's protection from negligent driving are
voluminous. A few of them are the following: BLT-Mi & KALVEN, PuBLic LAW
PERSPECTIES ON A PIrvATE LAW PROBLEM: AUTo COMPENSATION PLANs (1965);
Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HA~uv. L. REv. 713 (1965); Comm. on Compulsory Automobile Insurance of the Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, Auto Accidents-What Shall We Do
About Them?, 27 MINN. L. REv. 103 (1943); Keeton and O'Connell, Basic
Protection-A Proposal for Improving Automobile Claims Systems, 78 HA~v. L.
REv. 329 (1965); Vorys, Laws to Exclude Irresponsible Drivers, 150 Omo ST.
L.J. 101 (1954); Note, The Problem of the Financially Irresponsible MotoristNew 82York's MVAIC, 65 CoLrM. L. REv. 1075 (1965).
Note that the Legislature has taken a half-hearted step in this direction by
providing that a child under eighteen will be licensed only if his parent or some
adult assumes the responsibilities imposed upon him by KRS 186.590. See KRS
186.470. The provision is "half-hearted" because it does not recuire that the
parent or adult be financially responsible. The plaintiff might well find himself
in the position of having a cause of action against the child and/or the adult
who signed the application, both of whom are judgment proof.
83KRS ch. 187 (1942).
s4 Kentucky's "financial responsibility" laws, like most states', began as pure
financial responsibility laws. They provided that after a judgment entered against
an irresponsible driver remained unsatisfied for a certain length of time, his
(Continued on next page)
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Another alternative would be implementation of a compulsory insurance program. 5 The General Assembly's persistent refusal to supply
the public with effective protection from uncompensated injury on
Kentucky highways is a disgrace to that institution and to our state.
Another legislative possibility is a bailor liability statute,80 unrestricted by an age limit and operative whether or not the owner of
the vehicle consented to or knew of the operation by the bailee,87 except in cases of flagrant disregard of limitations and stolen vehicles.
Finally, the General Assembly should weigh the advantages of an
automobile "compensation" system similar to the workmen's compenstation system.88
But the family purpose doctrine, like a man, is to be praised for
its virtues as well as criticized for its vices. While the doctrine's vice,
namely, its exceptions, may preclude recovery in a given case, its
virtue is that if an exception is not applicable the parent will bear the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

driver's license and automobile registration would be revoked. Again following the
trend in most states, the Kentucky law was soon broadened to include "securityresponsibility" provisions. By these provisions, any driver involved in a collision
would have his driving privileges suspended if he failed to deposit security to
perfect a potential adverse judgment within a few days after the collision. Even
with the added security provision the present financial responsibility laws have
one glaring weakness-they allow the irresponsible driver a 'first bite," since they
afford no protection to the first victim of his negligence. See Grad, Recent
Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLUm. L. REv. 300,
306-07 (1950); Vorys, Laws to Exclude Irresponsible Drivers, 15 OHIo ST. L.J.
101, 102-03 (1954).
85 But compulsory insurance is not a panacea. See Note, The Problem of the
Financially Irresponsible Motorist-New York's MVAIC, 65 CoLum. L. Rmv.
1075 (1965).
86 Again, the General Assembly has met this problem half-way. KRS 186.590
supra achieves the desired purpose to the extent its terms allow.
87 It is submitted that any objections to removing the consent and knowledge barriers to bailor liability could be overcome by the legislature's recognition of the need for such a provision to protect the motorist. An analogy can be
found in the Court's willingness to continually extend liability under the family
purpose
88 doctrine.
Admittedly this legislative alternative is the most extreme in terms of
departure from traditional fault-liability concepts. Speaking in the most general
of terms, such a plan would offer the plaintiff the assurance of some recovery for
his injury. The proponents of such a plan seem in the last analysis to support it
for this reason. See Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 CoLum. L. REv. 300, 313 (1950). But there is dissatisfaction with
the compensation theory. One writer's dissatisfaction results from his belief that
deterrence as well as compensation is a goal of shifting the loss arising from
automobile accidents from the injured party to the negligent party. For this reason
he would add tort or criminal sanctions to the compensation plan. Calabresi, The
Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Carts, 78 HArtv.
L REv. 713 (1965). Others feel that such a plan, in addition to lessening
deterrence, would achieve an undesirable extension of governmental involvement
in an area properly reserved for individual autonomy. BLum & KALVEN, Puneic
LAW PERSPECTivEs ON A PnavATE LAW PROBLEM: AuTo COMPENSATION PLANS 85
(1965).

1967]

NoTE

521

cost of his child's negligence. Until and unless the General Assembly
enacts legislation imposing liability without regard to the common law
notion of liability based only on fault, the doctrine will continue to
be a vital link in the motoring public's chain of defense against
negligent drivers.
William R. Harris

